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Summary 
Informal local governance institutions (ILGIs) are complex organisations, which continue to be prevalent at 
village level in rural India. Although generally perceived by educated Indians to be “oppressive”, ILGIs 
also have progressive features and often perform a range of useful, collective functions at the village level. 
Rather than shrinking in the face of modernity ILGIs have found ways to interact, often in a positive 
manner, with the newer formal, elected local government institutions – Grama Panchayats. On the basis of 
field research in Karnataka state, this paper tries to present a more holistic picture of ILGIs, including 
their role in village governance and service delivery; the ways in which they interact with Grama Panchayats, 
and the implications of their existence and role for local democracy. Finally, I present a tentative 
theoretical framework that might help explain why in Karnataka – and in India generally – ILGIs seem to 
be less repressive, more functional, and more likely to survive than in some other countries of the South.  
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1 
1  Introduction 
 
In a brutal display of its power, a caste panchayat in Haryana threw a couple, with their 18-month-old child, out 
of their village on August 23 for the reason that they had defied “the community norms of marriage”. 
(Frontline, 10 November 2000) 
 
JATIYA PANCHAYAT – a traditional judicial system based on castes – makes mockery of 53 years of 
Independence. The system is still prevalent in as many as 21,450 villages in Rajasthan . . .In Bharatpur district, 
people still remember the incident of 6 June 1992 when 17 harijans were killed by higher castes following a verdict 
of “jatiya panchayat” in their favour in Kumher town. 
(Hindustan Times, 21 November 2000) 
 
Week before last, a 19-year-old girl and her fiancé were paraded naked through the streets of a UP village by 
outraged members of the community. Their “crime”: three days before the scheduled wedding, the couple were 
allegedly “caught” spending time together at the girl’s house. It was a full two hours before the “community” felt 
satisfied that the guilty had been punished and the ends of justice duly met. A little earlier, offended members of a 
powerful agricultural caste had burnt alive a young Dalit boy, dead in the centre of another village square, for 
courting a girl from the dominant community. 
(Times of India, 29 July 2001) 
 
Indian newspapers often headline horrific stories about atrocities committed against Dalits1 or women by 
village panchayats (councils). These panchayats often mete out harsh punishments, including 
excommunication and even death sentences, to villagers who transgress social norms, especially those who 
defy caste boundaries and caste endogamy and engage in inter-caste sexual relationships. The cases cited 
above are not isolated. Such stories are innumerable.  
What are these panchayats, and how should we best label them? They go under a wide variety of local 
names in India. Generic labels may be controversial, as they may be read as implying a particular 
interpretation of these organisations. This is especially the case with words like “traditional” and 
“informal”. I want to be as neutral as possible, and will simply label them informal local governance institutions 
(ILGIs). ILGIs are prevalent in most of rural India in some form or other. Krishna (2002: 136) finds them 
functioning in every one of the 69 villages he studied in the North Indian states of Rajasthan and Madhya 
Pradesh. I found the same in the 30 randomly selected villages that I am currently studying in three 
districts  of  the  South  Indian state  of  Karnataka.  The  Eastern Indian  state of  West Bengal  has  been 
                                                 
1  Here used synonymously with Scheduled Castes (formerly known as “untouchables” and referred to as 
“harijans” by Gandhi). Increasingly the term Dalit is also used in a wider political sense, representing all those 
that are socially and politically marginalised. 
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governed for 26 years by a Communist Party – the Communist Party of India (Marxist) – that has 
penetrated deeply into rural society. Yet informal local dispute resolution bodies (Shalishi) continue to 
play a significant role there at village level (Gupta 2001).  
Not only are ILGIs prevalent in rural India but, as I show below, they are also highly 
institutionalised: they embody stable, recurring and valued behaviour patterns (Huntington 1965). Yet we 
know relatively little about them, and there is a great difference between reality and the beliefs held by 
urban and middle class Indians, that are shaped principally by newspaper reports, but also by some social 
science literature. The typical urban perception is that ILGIs are: 
 
1. Essentially instruments of caste dominance, that either simply represent a single caste or, where they 
include representatives of more than one caste, are controlled by the locally dominant caste.  
2. Oppressive in nature, serving solely or mainly to enforce “traditional” norms and hierarchies, notably 
in relation to caste and gender.  
3. Shrinking or fading in face of modernity, especially in the face of competition from the formal, 
elected local village councils (Grama Panchayats).  
 
These popular beliefs may not be entirely wrong. However, the full picture is more complex. ILGIs have 
“functional” and “progressive”, as well as “oppressive” features. They interact with formal local 
government institutions. And they sometimes perform broad developmental roles, as well as acting as 
mechanisms of (repressive) social control. The purpose of this paper is to tell these other sides of the 
story. It is based in part on the existing literature on informal local institutions in India and elsewhere. The 
principal sources are however (a) my previous research on local political communication and women’s 
participation in local governance in Karnataka state and (b) my current research on informal local 
governance in 30 villages in three Karnataka districts. ILGIs are actually quite diverse, even in terms of 
how villagers describe and name them. They are also quite variable in structure and in activities. Detailed 
research is essential to enable us to (1) counter the stereotypes propagated in sensationalist newspaper 
stories, (2) understand in more detail what these institutions do, and (3) therefore appreciate properly their 
role in local governance. On the basis of the various sources available to me, I conclude that in reality 
ILGIs: 
 
1. Typically are inter-caste institutions, comprising the leaders of different caste groups in a community, 
and are in some real sense representative bodies whose procedures are characterised more by 
deliberation, negotiation, and compromise than by simple rule enforcement. 
2. Do not only enforce “traditional” rules and norms, but also perform a range of useful collective 
functions at the village level, often in a consensual manner. They arbitrate a range of disputes at the 
village level, act as support structures by providing monetary and other assistance to people in 
distress, and, as Wade (1988) found in Andhra Pradesh state, often mobilise significant sums of 
financial and other resources for developmental projects. 
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3. Are not linearly declining or shrinking in the face either of modernity in general, and more modern, 
elected local councils in particular. Instead, they interact with these formal, local governance 
institutions, often in a positive way. Note that one reason for this is that in Karnataka at least, and 
probably in most of India, a single ILGI typically serves a single “natural” village that often has a 
nucleated residence pattern, while the formal, elected Grama Panchayats usually covers a cluster of such 
“natural” villages.2 
 
I summarise, in Sections 2 to 4 respectively, the evidence from Karnataka on each of these three 
conclusions. In Section 5, I comment on the question of why there appears to be such a mismatch 
between the reality about ILGIs and popular (urban) perceptions. In Section 6, I present a tentative 
framework that helps explain why, in India relative to some other developing countries, ILGIs might be 
more benign, less in conflict with formal, elected local governments, and more able to contribute to local 
development. Section 7 contains some concluding comments. 
 
2  The composition of ILGIs in Karnataka 
Indian society is very much (self-) organised around cellular units – mainly caste. But that organisation is 
so natural and implicit that, when researchers ask people about existing “associations” and their activities, 
they often do not find anything, or are directed towards modern associations formed under the influence 
of external interventions of various kinds. This is true of Karnataka. In reality, a profusion of local 
organisations, structured mainly around individual caste groups, exist in the villages. These may be intra-
village caste panchayats and/or street panchayats3 (for a single street or a group of streets). These 
organisations operate at sub-village level and have limited authority – restricted to a caste group in the 
case of caste panchayats or limited to the population of a street or few streets in case of street panchayats. 
The ILGI is a higher level organisation, with jurisdiction over the entire village, that essentially comprises 
a “congress” of these sub-village caste organisations. Authority over the entire village allows the ILGI to 
act as a higher forum for “appeals” if issues are not satisfactorily resolved in lower bodies. These whole-
village organisations, that I term ILGIs, are among the more widely-found of a set of informal, caste-
based local governance institutions that vary from place to place.  
The diversity of ILGIs is evident above all in the terms that villagers use to label them. My current 
research, in the Mysore, Dharwad and Raichur districts4 of Karnataka state, illustrates this very clearly. In 
the southern part of the state, particularly in Mysore district, ILGIs are know locally as panchayati (Council), 
Halli panchayati (Village Council), nadu or nadu panchayati (Regional Council), nyaya panchayati (Justice 
                                                 
2  For a further understanding of this distinction between nucleated villages and natural villages, see ‘The 
Dominant Caste in Rampura’ (Srinivas 2002). 
3  I came across street panchayats in only one big village where the ILGI was relatively weak.  
4  During the colonial period, these three districts belonged to different regions. Mysore was the capital of 
princely state of Mysore, Dharwad belonged to Bombay Presidency and Raichur was part of Hyderabad State 
under the rule of the Nizam of Hyderabad. These three districts represent regions with distinctive agrarian 
structures, agricultural development patterns, and social and cultural backgrounds. 
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Council) or even nyaya samiti (Justice Committee). In northern Karnataka, particularly in the area covered 
by the former Dharwad district, the terms pancharu or Hireru (village elders) are prevalent, while in one 
village the ILGI is known as the Civic Board. In Raichur district the common term is Daiva (God).  
This diversity of names indicates the diverse nature of the institution itself. Throughout Karnataka 
ILGIs seem to have a common core agenda of upholding social norms and customs and preserving local 
law and order. At the same time, they also find ways to adapt to differing and changing contexts. The 
resilience and adaptability of ILGIs derive in large measure from the caste system. Caste is not as 
inflexible and rigid as is often supposed, and has survived the advent of democracy and the forces of 
modernisation. Contrary to “optimistic” expectations that it would wilt under the pressure of modernity 
and (hopefully) wither away, caste has adapted itself to changing contexts. Its role in electoral politics is 
very evident. Similarly, ILGIs continue to operate at the local level despite the increased importance of 
their statutory, elected counterparts, the Grama Panchayats. ILGIs might be viewed as a manifestation or 
extension of the caste system. It should, therefore, induce no surprise that they also share its resilience and 
adaptability. The basic reasons for this adaptability are common to both cases. The more “traditional” 
leaderships of ILGIs know that they will lose power and authority unless they adapt the institution to 
accommodate changes in the broader political context.  
Srinivas describes “village councils” (ILGIs) as being ‘informal and flexible’ bodies with ‘no hard and 
fast rule about who should constitute them’. He has also observed a variation in membership over space 
and context (2002: 81). Mandelbaum’s (1970) detailed study of “village panchayats” from different parts of 
the country indicates a similar flexible pattern of representation. This fluidity and flexibility allows ILGIs 
to adapt to local and to changing contexts.  
ILGIs are variable over space and time. But all appear to have visible memberships: a set of people who 
are recognised as having the right or duty to meet in a structured way to discuss, debate and, sometimes, 
to decide. I will call these members panchas, employing a term that is no longer widely used in Karnataka; 
and will call the leader the Yajamana – a term that is still in widespread use. The nature of membership 
varies from village to village, and changes a little from time to time within individual villages. However, 
two facts stand out. First, virtually all panchas are men. The only exceptions I found were that, in two cases 
(not part of my sample of 30 villages), elected female members of the formal Grama Panchayat were 
sometimes invited to join in the deliberations of the ILGI for specific purposes. Otherwise, men dominate 
totally. Second, ILGIs are constituted on the basis of caste, and understood to be so.  
Generally, the size of an ILGI is broadly proportional to the number of caste groups present in a 
village. In all villages the ILGI consists of (a) a core membership representing mainly the leaders of the 
major caste groups in the village and (b) occasional other members, invited according to context or need. 
In most villages, some or all of the core members are viewed as having lifetime tenure unless and until 
they decide to step down. These are normally people considered to have inherited leadership of a 
5 
particular caste group.5 ILGIs are generally linked “upwards” with the elected Grama Panchayats that have 
territorial responsibility for several “natural villages”. But they are also linked “downwards” to caste 
organisations within individual villages. In single caste villages, caste organisations are effectively the 
ILGIs. In multi caste villages, in Karnataka as elsewhere in rural India, each caste tends to have one or 
more recognised “caste leaders”6 who have informal responsibilities that are both internal to their own 
constituency (e.g. in resolving small disputes within the caste group) and external (e.g. mediating relations 
with other caste groups). Both these roles make them “natural” members of the ILGI. The ILGI broadly 
represents caste groups in the village. But it does not represent them equally. For instance, an ILGI might 
have more members from an “upper” or locally dominant caste group compared to other caste groups 
considered lower in the caste hierarchy. Krishna’s study of village councils in Rajasthan indicates a similar 
composition – a roughly proportionate representation of all caste groups in the village (2002: 136). 
Apart from the core membership rooted in caste, some ILGIs have other members whose inclusion 
is based on more modern criteria. It is here that the variation in the membership of ILGIs is most visible. 
An interesting phenomenon is the emergence of “new leadership” in most villages. Some ILGIs now 
include new members who are local leaders because of their political linkages, education, mobility, and 
ability to interact with government officials. The emergence of new and parallel leadership at the village 
level is not a new phenomenon. It is driven above all by the expansion in the number of government rural 
development programmes and the increasing value and power of people who have the education, personal 
skills and political connections to act as intermediaries between villages and political and bureaucratic 
arenas. As early as the 1960s, Bailey (1960) had identified changes taking place in traditional leaderships 
with the emergence of new types of leaderships based on new networks. Subsequently, Beteille (1965) 
identified the emergence of a new set of leaders, to a certain extent independent of both caste and class in 
villages of Tamil Nadu. In his study of Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh villages, Krishna (2002) identifies 
three sets of leaders: traditional village leaders, elected Grama Panchayat leaders and naya netas (“new 
leaders”), with little overlap between them. The experience from Karnataka seems to differ. The “new 
leaders” often find a place on ILGIs and play active roles there. Another set of people who are sometimes 
represented in ILGIs are the people elected from the village to the new (since 1993) Grama Panchayats that 
encompass several “natural villages”.  
ILGIs are headed by the Yajamana, who usually takes initiatives, plays the major role in framing a 
consensus in the decision-making process, and may take decisions if there is no consensus. He is thus able 
to exercise considerable influence. To be considered as a Yajamana, a person should be acceptable to 
different communities in the village. This invariably means that he should belong to a caste that is 
acceptable to all. Consequently, despite the diversification of membership, in Karnataka the leadership of 
                                                 
5  Villagers still recognise hereditary positions but are quick to state that the future generations or the youth in the 
village should prove their leadership qualities and cannot expect a leadership position because of this 
entitlement.  
6  Some caste groups in a few villages have a leadership, that is at times elected, and accounts (of funds collected 
by that particular caste group for religious and other purposes) that are checked by the people belonging to that 
particular caste group around every Hindu New Year. Caste organisations have jurisdiction over all families 
belonging to that caste in the village. These organisations are often quite formal and institutionalised.  
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ILGIs remains in the hands of locally dominant caste groups such as the Lingayats or Vokkaligas.7 The 
Yajamana of the ILGI is usually the leader of the dominant and/or forward caste of the village. A junior 
leader (Chikka Yajamana) is usually appointed to take care of such issues as organising meetings, and 
informing the community about meetings.  
However, the nature of leadership has undergone significant changes in the sense that ILGIs are no 
longer controlled by a single, dominant caste leader or big landowner of the village. It is perceived as a more 
deliberative forum, where decisions are arrived at after discussions and consensus. This “egalitarianism” is 
not unique to Karnataka ILGIs but also found in the village councils of Rajasthan where “panchas” 
(representatives) of all caste groups sit as equals on the central platform’ (Krishna 2002: 136). 
 
Table 2.1 Caste profile of ILGI leaders in 30 villages in Karnataka 
District Castes 
 Lingayat Vokkaliga Brahmin Scheduled 
Caste8 
Scheduled 
Tribe9 
Others* 
Mysore 2 5  1 2 1 
Dharwad 8  1   1 
Raichur 7  2  1 1 
Total 17 5 3 1 3 3 
 
* Others include Muslims and other caste groups such as Marathas and Kshatriyas.  
 
Table 2.1 relates to 30 sample villages and 32 ILGI leaders, because a few ILGIs have more than one 
leader. This apparent power sharing usually occurs in villages with a numerically dominant population 
from the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes. In such instances, the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled 
Tribe leader is considered an ILGI leader along with a leader belonging to another group. In two villages, 
Muslim leaders are considered as ILGI leaders along with Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe leaders. This 
is because Muslims are considered to be higher in the social hierarchy than Scheduled Castes/Scheduled 
Tribes in the sample villages.  
The normal pattern in Karnataka is that ILGIs are composed of representatives of dominant and 
major caste groups. There is variation in the extent of inclusion of (a) new leaders and (b) Scheduled 
Castes. While marginalised groups such as Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes have better access and 
representation in ILGIs than do women, the extent of their inclusion seems to vary from region to region. 
In some villages, particularly in southern Karnataka, where Scheduled Caste population is substantial, 
Scheduled Caste leaders are part of the ILGI. In most north Karnataka villages they are excluded. Even 
                                                 
7  Traditionally land owning and numerically strong caste groups. 
8  ‘ “Scheduled Castes” means such castes, races or tribes or parts of or groups within such castes, races or tribes 
as are deemed under article 341 to be Scheduled Castes for the purposes of this Constitution’ (Constitution of 
India). 
9  ‘ “Scheduled Tribes” mean such tribes or tribal communities or parts of or groups within such tribes or tribal 
communities as are deemed under article 342 to be Scheduled Tribes for the purposes of the Constitution’ 
(Constitution of India). 
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where they are part of the ILGI, the influence of Scheduled Caste leaders is sometimes very limited. Thus 
a whole range of situations is visible, from total exclusion to active involvement of Scheduled Caste 
leaders.10  
I know of a village in Mysore district where the Scheduled Caste population was able to get the 
Lingayat ILGI leader changed. When the Scheduled Caste population felt insulted by him during a village 
festival, they cut off all direct contact with the Lingayat community. The matter was resolved only when 
the ILGI called a meeting of the villagers and agreed to the demand of the Scheduled Caste population 
that the leadership be changed. A former Lingayat ILGI leader, who had given up the leadership, was 
reinstated. In another Mysore village, an active Scheduled Caste leader (also a former Grama Panchayat 
president) is considered by the villagers as one of the ILGI leaders. Such cases are not common and still 
restricted to villages with substantial Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe populations, but they point to 
the changing nature of ILGIs. 
ILGIs meet as and when required. The attendance of various panchas in meetings may vary with 
occasion, circumstances and the nature of business under consideration. The Yajamana is almost always 
present. The degree of formalisation of the meeting schedule varies widely. I know of one village in 
Mysore District where the ILGI  meets every Monday for purposes of dispute resolution. If however no 
cases are notified by 7.30 pm on Sunday, the meeting is cancelled. 
The presence of ordinary villagers at ILGI meetings depends upon the purpose for which the 
meeting is called. For instance, the process of dispute resolution (unless it is marital dispute) usually takes 
place in the presence of many villagers, mainly men. Men who are not panchas can plead their own cases 
before the ILGI. Women very rarely do so, but are in most cases silent observers of the proceedings from 
the periphery of the gathering. Their issues and views are placed before the ILGI by their male relatives. 
ILGIs in Karnataka continue to be gender biased. Positive changes in the status of women in other socio-
political spheres seem to have had minimal impact on this institution.  
Men’s attendance varies from village to village, but in most villages at least one male member from 
each family – usually the head of the household – is expected to attend. Young men may attend, but are 
allowed to participate in the discussions only if expressly permitted. Essentially, older men or male heads 
of the household are expected to represent and speak for the whole family. However the level of 
participation of the community in ILGI meetings depends upon the gravity of the issues being debated. 
The presence of the villagers in ILGI meetings is a way of ensuring community endorsement of decisions.  
While ILGIs draw their legitimacy from custom and tradition and are largely rooted in caste, they are 
not bound by “tradition”. They adapt to changing circumstances, as is evidenced by the appearance in 
some cases of Scheduled Caste leaders or members chosen by virtue of their election to the formal Grama 
Panchayat. But the change in membership has not extended to include better gender representation. ILGIs 
are still very patriarchal. 
                                                 
10  Relatively better representation of Scheduled Caste leaders in ILGIs in southern Karnataka, to a certain extent, 
may have its roots in the stronger mobilisation of the Dalit community and a relatively less skewed pattern of 
land holding there compared to other regions of the state. 
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3  Activities of ILGIs 
The common outsiders’ perception is that ILGIs are relics of the past, trying to maintain their centrality in 
village governance by reinforcing “traditional” values and norms, generally in an oppressive manner. Most 
media reports highlight this aspect of ILGIs, and rarely deal with their more positive and practical 
functions.  
Apart from their role as custodians of “traditional” norms and rules, ILGIs in Karnataka perform a 
wide range of useful, collective activities. These include organising social activities, dispensing informal 
justice, providing financial and moral support to those in need, and maintenance of local law and order. 
ILGIs may perform some or all these functions depending upon their influence and degree of activism.  
In all the 30 villages I studied in Karnataka, ILGIs were involved in collecting funds for religious 
activities, including temple construction, repairs and maintenance; and organising religious festivals, rituals 
and processions (Jathre). These are important tasks for ILGIs. Village festivals, especially those related to 
the village deity – grama devathe – are considered to be important social (and religious) events. They not 
only involve the entire village, but also establish and reinforce social networks with neighbouring villages. 
As Mandelbaum (1970) has observed, these village festivals are a manifestation of village solidarity. 
Formal invitations are often extended to neighbouring ILGIs to participate in them. There are also 
instances of ILGIs from 4–5 villages getting together to organise festivals.  
Local “dispute resolution” is an equally important task. It is generally believed that traditional justice 
institutions in India thrived during the colonial rule and gradually faded out there after (Galanter and 
Krishna 2003). This belief is not supported by my field evidence from Karnataka, where ILGIs are 
involved in dispute resolution in all the 30 sample villages. Krishna found that, in the 69 villages he 
studied in Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh, ILGIs dealt with nearly 80 per cent of disputes, and that 80 per 
cent of a sample of villagers preferred that formal, legal authority for dispute resolution should rest 
exclusively with these “informal” councils (Krishna 2002: 138).  
Villagers do not necessarily see dispute resolution by ILGIs as an end point, but rather as the first 
opportunity for justice because it is quick, affordable and accessible.11 In most villages, disputes brought 
before the ILGIs may be taken to the police station or to the formal legal system if not satisfactorily 
resolved there. The types of disputes that come before the ILGI are varied. They include petty disputes, 
thefts, encroachment issues, minor property disputes, drunken brawls, and marital problems including 
spouse abuse, desertion, bigamy, and alcoholism. Land or property disputes, between siblings and/or 
other people, are usually brought to the ILGI in the first instance. If they are not resolved to the 
satisfaction of both parties, then the ILGI advises them to approach the formal institutions of justice. 
Criminal cases are handed over to the police. Sexual offences are deemed to be extremely serious, and may 
lead to the ILGI meting out very heavy penalties. 
                                                 
11  While in most cases villagers respect the ILGI as an institution capable of delivering fair judgement, there are 
instances where ILGIs have been accused of being biased and corrupt.  
9 
An intra-caste dispute, in the first instance, is taken to the leader of that particular caste. If an 
acceptable solution is not reached at this level, it is then referred to the ILGI. Similarly, some petty 
disputes may be handled initially by caste or street panchayats, and referred to the ILGI only if the dispute 
is not satisfactorily resolved. Inter-caste disputes and/or issues that have relevance for the entire village 
are taken up directly by the ILGI. Disputes between two villages are usually resolved jointly by the ILGIs 
of both villages.  
Women’s cases are brought before the ILGI by the male members of the family. Only in extreme 
cases might a woman be asked to come before the ILGI to submit her case. Asking a woman to come 
before the ILGI is considered demeaning for the woman concerned. It is deeply inter-linked with the 
concept of Maryade12 (a keen sense of self-respect). A woman who has been either summoned by the ILGI 
or argues a case before the ILGI is presumed to have lost her and her family’s Maryade in the village. 
Interestingly, this proposition does not seem to have been put to test in the villages under study, as there 
are no verifiable cases or stories of women who, having appeared before the ILGI, lost their Maryade. But 
the concept is internalised to such an extent that women, especially young, educated women, interested in 
actively participating in the activities of the ILGI are unwilling to take the risk of contesting this myth.  
ILGIs also act as support mechanisms in specific situations. There are a number of cases of their 
helping destitute or widowed women to get a share of their husbands’ property, collecting funds from the 
villagers to help accident victims (generally from poor families), arranging funeral rites for destitute 
people, organising mass marriages for the poor, donating stationery to local school children, or supporting 
the education of gifted students.  
ILGIs have also played a significant role in maintaining communal harmony in villages with 
substantial Muslim populations. Varshney (2002) finds that the incidence of communal violence is 
significantly less in rural India compared to cities. In the cities, he found that ‘inter-communal’ networks 
forged through ‘associational forms of civic engagements’ help to promote communal harmony. I found 
much the same thing in villages with a Muslim population. For example, in a village in North Karnataka, 
the ILGI leader is the first to visit the mosque and present offerings during Muslim festivals. In some 
others, before the advent of any festival, either Hindu or Muslim, ILGI and Muslim leaders meet to 
ensure that the festivities are celebrated without any conflicts or tensions. In some ILGIs different caste 
groups also seek the support and cooperation of the ILGI during their festivities. Not only do ILGIs 
resolve conflicts, but they also play an active role in preventing them. Using an elaborate Index of 
Communal Harmony for 60 Rajasthan villages, Krishna found that the strength of the village council and 
the extent to which each village possesses “social capital” (i.e. a predisposition to cooperate) were factors 
‘significantly associated with the level of communal harmony in villages’ (2002: 118–30).  
All ILGIs raise resources, both cash and kind, for religious festivals. In addition, (a) some raise 
matching funds for development projects part-funded by state or central governments; and (b) a few raise 
                                                 
12  Maryade in the local language Kannada is a value-laden word. The closest equivalent in English is “honour”. 
Maryade is actually a combination of honour, self- respect and reputation of self and family. It is often used 
contextually.  
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resources for local economic development or collective local infrastructure, such as school buildings and 
local hospitals, or for organising the patrolling of fields to prevent thefts and unauthorised grazing. ILGIs 
do not have any permanent sources of finances. The two main sources of funds are donations and fines. 
Donations are collected from villagers for religious festivals and temple activities. Fines are imposed on 
those found to be guilty during dispute resolution processes. The size of fines varies with the severity of 
the offences. It could be as little as Rs.5, which is symbolic, or as high as Rs.500 for serious offences such 
as thefts, misbehaving with women, or repeat offences. In many villages a form of marriage tax is also 
collected. For example, when a man from the village gets married and brings back a bride, he or his family 
is expected to pay a small tax to the ILGI (from Rs.50–100 depending upon the village). If a girl marries 
and leaves the village, her family is also expected to pay a tax of Rs.25–50.  
How are ILGI decisions enforced? The ILGI leaders I interviewed agree that their decisions, 
particularly regarding dispute resolution, are not absolutely enforceable. One or other party to the dispute 
has the option of accessing formal police or judicial channels. ILGIs still manage to enforce most of their 
decisions through social pressure. For example, a person who has openly violated the dictates of the ILGI 
does not find support in the village in times of need or distress unless he or she openly tenders an apology 
to the ILGI for violating its dictates. However, the legitimacy of ILGIs and the extent to which they are 
able to enforce their decisions are somewhat contested. There is a general perception that they no longer 
enjoy the influence they once did when formal local institutions were relatively weak. But they remain very 
influential. Villagers, especially women, believe that in a context where they are still distant from the 
formal law and order mechanisms like the police and the judiciary, there is a need for locally-rooted 
institutions that provide justice and maintain local law and order.  
 
4  Interaction with formal local governance institutions 
Contrary to widespread belief, ILGIs are not shrinking or fading as elected local government institutions 
(Grama Panchayat) become more institutionalised and influential. I have already shown that ILGIs continue 
to perform a wide range of functions. They are continuously finding new avenues of influence. One such 
avenue of influence lies in interaction with Grama Panchayat, the lowest tier of the formal elected local 
government institutions. I will term Grama Panchayats Formal Local Governance Institutions (FLGIs). 
This interaction between ILGIs and FLGIs takes a variety of forms. Before explaining these forms, let me 
first note that there is even less understanding of this interaction than of other roles and activities of 
ILGIs. This is true of ordinary villagers as much as outside observers. Ordinary villagers do not always 
appreciate the behind-the-scene influence that is wielded by their ILGIs. Villagers tend to view ILGIs and 
FLGIs as very different institutions: the first principally “social” and operating at the village level and the 
second “political” and operating at a higher governmental level. This is specifically because in Karnataka 
FLGIs usually cover a group of natural villages.  
The 1992 constitutional amendment that established an elected three-tier government structure at the 
sub-state level – Panchayati Raj Institutions – was silent on the role of ILGIs. In 1996, national level 
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legislation – ‘The Provisions of the Panchayats (Extension to the Scheduled Areas) Act 1996’ – allowed 
for the accommodation of the tribal laws and customs in tribally dominated regions.13 This development 
came in the wake of objections and protests that formal, local governance structures as mandated by the 
Constitution would impede and destroy the tribal ways of life (Mahi Pal 2000). ILGIs have not received 
any equivalent recognition, and although influential in some ways, have remained entirely informal. 
The interaction between ILGIs and FLGIs that I uncovered was surprising given Karnataka’s long 
history and impressive record of democratic decentralisation. While statutory elected institutions have 
existed for decades, and particularly so after 1959, it is the 1983 state-level legislation14 that was truly 
politically empowering. The constitutional amendment in 199215 has reinforced their position. 
Quite a lot of research has been undertaken on Panchayati Raj Institutions in Karnataka. However, 
the interaction between ILGIs and FLGIs has not been detected.  
My evidence from the field reveals several types of interactions, which I label: 
 
1. Influencing FLGI elections 
2. Overlap of leadership 
3. Implementation of development projects 
4. Selection of beneficiaries for government anti-poverty projects 
5. Informal resource mobilisation 
 
The extent of interaction varies from village to village. All five types are present in some places. The 
extent of interaction depends largely on the strength and influence of ILGIs. The influence is two-way: 
ILGIs influence FLGIs, and vice versa. The nature and outcomes of the interaction can be positive in 
some contexts and negative in others.  
 
4.1 Influencing FLGI elections 
An important type of interaction between formal and informal institutions is found in the process of 
electing members to the Grama Panchayats. The average Grama Panchayat (FLGI) in Karnataka represents 
5–7,000 people. One representative is elected for a population of 400 on the first-past-the-post principle. 
Thus  individual  ILGIs are able to  exercise a decisive influence  on one or more electorates.  They play a 
                                                 
13  India has a significant tribal population. It is estimated that they constitute about 8 per cent of the total 
population. Quotas are provided for the tribal population in various spheres to make the governance and 
development process more inclusive. 
14  The first major landmark was the 1983 Act, which introduced a two-tier, elected sub-state level governance 
structure. A notable feature was 25 per cent reservation for women in these bodies even before this was 
mandated by the Constitution. Elections under this Act were held in 1987. 
15  The 1983 Act was substituted by a new law in 1993 (the Karnataka Panchayat Raj Act, 1993) to accommodate 
the mandatory provisions brought in by the 73rd and 74th amendments to the Constitution. The 1993 Act 
provides for a three-tier structure – Zilla Panchayat (district level), Taluk Panchayat (block level) and Gram 
Panchayat (village level) – with representation for women, Scheduled Castes (SCs), Scheduled Tribes (STs) and 
Other Backward Classes (OBCs). 
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role in influencing nominations to the FLGIs and ensuring where possible that elections are unanimous 
(i.e. uncontested). In 28 out of 30 villages under study, the ILGI had played a role in selecting candidates 
for local elections in 2000.  
The process of influencing nominations to FLGIs varies. In some villages, the ILGI calls for a 
meeting of the villagers after the elections are announced and decides on the list of candidates. Candidates 
endorsed by the ILGI are advised to file their nomination papers and other people interested in contesting 
elections are asked not to do so. In other villages, the decision on candidates for FLGIs is taken only 
when the last date for withdrawal of nominations is announced. At this point the ILGI intervenes, and 
other candidates are made to withdraw their nomination papers in favour of its candidates. The means of 
intervention may vary from requests, coercion and payoffs, (promises of benefits or chance to contest the 
next elections) to threats.16 In 18 out of my 30 sample villages “unanimous” elections took place in 2000: 
in four cases all the seats were uncontested, and in 16 villages at least one seat was uncontested. This is 
especially likely in seats reserved for women. In villages where there were contested elections – where the 
ILGI was unable to persuade the villagers on their choice of candidates – respondents say that most of 
the candidates who were finally elected were those originally chosen by the ILGIs. The villages I studied 
seem to be typical of Karnataka as a whole: in the 2000 Grama Panchayat elections, 26 per cent seats were 
filled by “unanimous” elections (The Hindu, 1 March 2000; The Deccan Herald 2000). 
Broadly, ILGIs act as “gatekeeper” institutions that control nominations to local elections and 
influence the pattern of representation. They perform the same functions as the other “gatekeeper” 
institutions – party leaders, political funders, interest group leaders – that Conway (2001: 231–3) has 
identified for US politics. Conway deals particularly with the effects of gatekeeper institutions on women’s 
political participation. Her basic point is that, while culture and patriarchy are important influences on 
reducing women’s political participation, insufficient attention has been paid to the role of gatekeeper 
institutions. She suggests there is substantial evidence that gatekeepers play a much bigger role than has 
been believed in influencing the ‘prior selection phase of office seeking’ of women candidates. In 
Karnataka, the gatekeeper role of ILGIs seems to be especially effective where women candidates are 
concerned. Political space at the local level has been created for women since 1992 with the reservation of 
one third of seats in FLGIs for them. However, despite widespread formal compliance with this 
legislation, women representatives are rarely able to exercise much political influence. The patriarchal bias 
in Indian culture is generally believed to be largely responsible. My research in Karnataka suggests a more 
direct and tangible institutional explanation: the influence of the ILGI over candidacy to local elections. 
                                                 
16  I found no hard evidence of direct threats, but heard many suggestions about subtle intimidation, such as ‘if 
you go ahead against our wishes and contest, we will make sure you lose’.  
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One manifestation of this influence is the low proportion of women representatives elected to 
FLGIs who are subsequently re-elected.17 My research indicates that the influence of ILGIs in preventing 
women from re-contesting elections is a major constraint on their political opportunities. The ways in 
which this is achieved varies widely from open opposition to women’s re-nomination to moral blackmail 
or inducing a feeling of obligation. Women are often accused of being selfish and greedy and denying 
chances for other women if they insist on re-contesting for elections.  
This is a cause of concern as it affects the overall process of developing women’s political skills and 
participation. The lack of continuity in office prevents women from building their political skills and 
constituencies and limits their political careers. Perpetual turnover of personnel continually places a new 
set of inexperienced women in elected positions. Their political participation in local governance is likely 
to be less than impressive. The intense investment in training and capacity building for women 
representatives is unlikely to yield positive results if this alternation continues (AnanthPur 2002). 
 
4.2. Overlap of leadership 
The control that ILGIs exercise over the selection of candidates to FLGI elections may be used to have 
the ILGI leadership elected to the FLGIs. Overlap among the leaders of FLGIs and ILGIs is widespread. 
In 26 out of my 30 villages, some form of overlap of leadership occurs. For example, the Yajamana of the 
ILGI in one village is also the president of the FLGI. In another village, an ILGI leader was the previous 
president of FLGI. In the same village, the son of the ILGI Yajamana is presently a member of the FLGI. 
In a number of villages, panchas are also members of the FLGI. A variant of this overlap is particularly 
likely in the selection of candidates for women’s seats. The candidates chosen are often related to the 
leader or members of ILGI. For example, there are instances of the ILGI leaders’ or members’ wives, 
daughters-in-law or sisters being either unanimously elected or chosen to contest elections to FLGIs. The 
wife of a pancha in a village in north Karnataka is also the president of FLGI. As she is illiterate her 
husband handles most of her official duties. In this instance, most of the issues related to formal local 
governance activities are brought before the ILGI and decisions taken after consultations with the leader 
and other members of the ILGI. Consequently, the line between the formal and informal institution is 
increasingly blurred.  
This overlap of leadership at times has the endorsement of the villagers. In many cases villagers 
propose, initiate and support the candidature of ILGI Yajamana and/or members for representation in the 
FLGI. The rationale is that the ILGI leaders will be able to perform better and bring development to the 
village. Conversely, the attempts by ILGIs to control nominations to FLGIs or obtain nominations for 
themselves or their kin are not always successful. Reforms from above in the form of reservation of seats 
and the process of democratic decentralisation have created awareness among villagers regarding the 
                                                 
17  Seats are reserved for women in FLGIs on a rotation basis. For example, if constituency A is reserved for 
women this term, the reservation may shift to constituency B or C in the next elections thus compelling 
interested women to contest against men. This has further exacerbated the problem of women‘s re-election. 
However the inference arrived at here is based on cases of women who had the opportunity to re-contest 
elections but were denied that chance by the ILGI.  
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importance of these formal structures. This has led to an increased interest in local political participation 
and representation. In a couple of villages, the ILGI Yajamanas who belong to the dominant caste groups, 
have little interest in controlling nominations as all the seats in the village are reserved for Scheduled 
Castes and Scheduled Tribes. In another case, there was opposition within the village to the list of 
“consensus candidates”, as there were a number of villagers interested in contesting elections. In yet 
another village, some people did not accept the unanimous choice of an ILGI Yajamana’s son as the 
candidate for FLGI, and nominated another candidate. The ILGI Yajamana’s son went on to win. There 
are at least couple of instances of panchas or their kin losing the elections to candidates who were not part 
of the ILGI. Such incidents, although limited in number, point to the importance of opening up formal 
spaces and their potential influence in countering the local political monopolies that ILGIs often 
represent.  
Table 4.1 relates to (a) the ways in which ILGIs influence the FLGI elections in my 30 study villages 
in Karnataka, and (b) the extent of their influence. 
 
Table 4.1 Influence of ILGIs on elections to FLGIs in year 2000 in 30 Karnataka villages 
District Number of villages in 
which candidates for 
FLGI election were 
selected by ILGIs  
 
Number of villages in 
which elections were 
unanimous 
 
Number of villages 
where there was 
post-election 
overlap of 
leadership between 
ILGI and FLGI  
Raichur 9 out of 10  7 out of 10: unanimity 
for all seats in 1 village, 
and for some seats in 6 
villages 
7 out of 10  
Dharwad All 10  6 out of 10: unanimity 
for all seats in 1 
village; 6 out of 10 
seats in another 
village; and some seats 
in 4 other villages 
All 10  
Mysore All 10  5 out of 10: unanimity 
for all seats in 2 
villages and for some 
seats in 3 villages. 
9 out of 10 
 
4.3 Implementation of development projects 
In almost all the villages I studied, the ILGI leaders play an important role in negotiating with the formal, 
local representatives and institutions for benefits to the village even where they have had little 
involvement in the selection of formal local representatives. This assumes a special significance when the 
local councillors or representatives are handpicked by the ILGI. In all the villages studied, the elected 
representatives agreed that they were pressured, subtly or overtly, by the ILGI to secure benefits for the 
village. The performance of the formal elected leaders is constantly monitored by the ILGI.  
The ILGI generally supports the elected members in negotiating with the FLGI for benefits to the 
village. There are instances of ILGI Yajamana or panchas briefing elected members about the development 
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needs of the village prior to the formal council meeting or accompanying the elected representatives to the 
FLGI to demand speedy delivery of services or repairs that have been pending. The ILGI constantly puts 
pressure on the elected members for development projects such as construction or repairs of school 
buildings and community halls, provision of drinking water, roads, and drainages. This was evident in all 
the villages visited.  
This type of interaction cannot necessarily be construed as negative. It benefits the entire community 
and it could be argued that it helps to make the elected members more responsive to their electorate, and 
thus strengthen democracy. However, this relationship is not always benign and to the benefit of the 
entire community. First, such pressure is unlikely to exist or be effective where there is overlap of 
leadership. Second, there are instances of ILGIs influencing decisions related to the location of services 
within the village – such as street lights, water taps, drainage etc – in favour or themselves or of other 
village elites. This has direct and negative implications for the welfare of the community as whole and the 
poor in particular.  
 
4.4 Selection of beneficiaries 
Another sphere where ILGI-FLGI interaction might adversely affect the poor relates to the selection of 
beneficiaries for government anti-poverty projects. Various anti-poverty programmes (employment, 
housing etc) funded by state or central government are channelled through FLGIs. The selection of 
beneficiaries usually takes place at the village level thus providing a space for the ILGI to intervene. The 
involvement of ILGIs in this process may either make the process more transparent, or lead to the ILGI 
members using their influence to strengthen their position in the village by bestowing favours on those 
who support them. I have evidence of both types of outcome. ILGI leaders generally claim to be more 
attuned to the local reality and feel they are better placed to identify beneficiaries. This attitude extends to 
the ILGI leaders suggesting as beneficiaries people who have not even put in applications.  
The process of selection of beneficiaries for anti-poverty schemes is expected take place in an open 
village assembly (Grama Sabha) organised by the FLGI, with the full consensus of the participating 
villagers. All adults of the village are members of this forum. However the strong role and influence of 
ILGIs in these processes may subvert the participatory nature of selection, and bring in an element of 
patronage and clientelism. Equally, there are instances where the intervention of the ILGI has prevented 
patronage by FLGI members and ensured benefits to the genuine target groups. 
While influencing decisions related to village development activities or selection of beneficiaries, the 
ILGI may not always intervene as an institution but may choose to intervene through its Yajamana or 
individual panchas. However these people are not acting in a private capacity but as representatives of the 
ILGI. Their importance comes from their association with the ILGI. 
 
4.5 Informal resource mobilisation 
The role played by ILGIs in informal resource mobilisation has remained under-explored in most rural 
research. In all the 30 villages studied, ILGIs were involved in some form of informal resource 
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mobilisation for religious purposes. This may include organising religious festivals, repairs to old temples 
or building new temples in the village. A number of ILGIs have used the surplus funds from religious 
activities, festivals and fines for development or “social” activities such as cleaning the roads/drainages, 
helping gifted students with school fees, or donating stationery to the local school. Some ILGIs have 
contributed to village development by donating or soliciting donations of land from villagers or 
neighbouring villagers for building schools, anganwadis (pre-schools), or community halls. Increasingly a 
number of development projects initiated through FLGIs now require matching grant contributions from 
the villagers. One such programme is the rural water and sanitation programme, which requires 20 per 
cent contributory grants to be raised by the community. While in a few villages, ILGI has been successful 
in raising this matching grant, in others the project was not taken up, as the ILGI was not involved in the 
process.  
ILGIs are not always successful in mobilising resources for development purposes. Villagers by and 
large donate more readily towards religious festivals than village development activities. There is a general 
feeling that development activities are the responsibility of FLGIs. However, a few ILGIs have managed 
to raise resources for development projects initiated both by ILGIs and FLGIs. One such example 
occurred in Raichur district where the ILGI has collected funds for – 
 
• Constructing an approach road to the village. Villagers also donated tractors, labour and some 
adjoining land to widen the road.  
• Purchasing 4 acres of land for the construction of a high school building in the village, ensuring that 
female students had easier access to higher education.  
• Purchasing land for building a small hospital in the village.  
• Building a community hall which is available free of charge for weddings  
• A contributory grant of Rs.200,000 for the sanitation programme implemented by the FLGI, with 
Rs.100,000 coming from the temple fund, and Rs.100,000 from donations. 
 
In addition, the ILGI leaders have donated land for building a veterinary clinic, and living quarters for the 
pre-school (agnanwadi) teacher and village nurse. The ILGI has also tried to access money from various 
formal sources, such as the MLA fund18 and Hyderabad-Karnatak Development Board,19 for village 
development. 
This does not necessarily signify that people in this village are intrinsically more willing to contribute 
towards village development than elsewhere. The ILGI is more innovative and active. It has used its 
power to mobilise resources, at times in the name of religious activities  and the numerous village temples, 
                                                 
18  Each Member of Legislative Assembly (MLA) is given Rs.40 lakhs as constituency development fund. 
19  Development boards were established to redress regional imbalances in development within Karnataka. 
Hyderabad-Karnatak Development Board mainly deals with the infrastructure development of districts that 
belong to this region. 
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and has diverted some of it to development projects. However, villagers perceive that the ILGI has played 
a key role in village development, and this in turn has motivated them to donate more generously than 
elsewhere.  
Why are ILGIs more effective in local resource mobilisation in one context and less effective in 
another? This is especially relevant in the context of the growing popularity of development projects with 
a built-in requirement for matching local contributions and needs further probing.  
In addition, in some villages, informal resource mobilisation for village development activities has 
also been linked to local elections. Where “unopposed” elections have taken place, potential short-listed 
candidates were asked to contribute to the village fund the equivalent of what their election campaign 
would cost. These candidates were then “unanimously” elected. The money is usually utilised for village 
development or for maintaining the village temple (The Times of India, 22 February 2000 and Indian Express, 
4 February 2000). In one village in Mysore district, Rs.25,000/- was mobilised through “unanimous” 
FLGI elections, and used to purchase land for living quarters for the local nurse. The ILGI decided to use 
the money in this manner because the land officially allocated for nurses' quarters was remote from the 
main road (AnanthPur 2002).  
In sum, there is a wide range of interactions between the ILGIs and FLGIs in Karnataka. The extent 
and type varies from village to village. However, some form of interaction existed in all the villages 
studied. This clearly indicates that, rather than shrinking, ILGIs have found new ways of relating with and 
adjusting to the formal local institutions that are believed to be displacing them. ILGIs are responding to 
new demands and needs that have emerged with the introduction of FLGIs. The interaction has positive 
and negative dimensions but should certainly receive more attention. 
 
5  Why are ILGIs overlooked? 
The previous sections present a more diverse picture of ILGIs than is generally reported or understood. A 
large body of knowledge exists on informal and “traditional” institutions in India and an equally large 
body of knowledge is emerging on local governance and democratic decentralisation. But the literature on 
local governance and democracy has not paid enough attention to the influence of ILGIs on local 
governance in general and on FLGIs in particular.  
Why does this gap exist in our understanding of local governance? There are four potential answers.  
 
1. The media coverage of ILGIs is largely one-dimensional, with the oppressive dimensions being 
constantly emphasised. A recent report in a local Kannada newspaper sensationalises the news of a 
murder of one participant in a land dispute between two cousins, which the ILGI was arbitrating. The 
fact that the ILGI had little or nothing to do with the murder gets camouflaged by the headline which 
states ‘Jameenu Vivaada: Nyaya Panchayathi jaagadalle kole’ (Land dispute: murder at the site of Nyaya 
Panchayati) (Kannada Prabha, 7 July 2003). Newspaper reports such as those presented in Section One 
generally portray ILGIs in a negative light, often dramatizing their oppressiveness. The more positive 
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aspects of ILGIs, such as their role as support structures or their efforts in local resource mobilisation 
for development programmes, are not always covered in the media.  
2. A related point is that ILGIs are often observed within a conceptual framework of tradition versus 
modernity, where modern institutions – FLGIs – are perceived as being more representative and less 
oppressive.  
3. A particular dimension of the previous point is a tendency to underestimate the constructive capacity 
of “traditional” institutions, especially their capacity to mobilise and handle significant sums of 
money. Robert Wade (1986) studied irrigated villages in Andhra Pradesh in the early 1980s and 
discovered some ILGIs raising larger amounts of money that they used to acquire and manage 
irrigation water. They raised this money partly by manipulating auctions for liquor licences, and partly 
by renting out fallow village agricultural land to pastoralists for animal grazing. The size of these 
resources was a surprise to him and to Indian social science. We still know little about the extent to 
which ILGIs are involved in resource mobilisation in India generally, but it seems to be much greater 
than widely assumed.  
4. Social science research on informal and “traditional” institutions is more holistic and objective, than 
media reports. “Traditional” and informal institutions in the Indian countryside have long fascinated 
social scientists. A rich knowledge on various facets of these institutions has emerged over decades of 
research. However, a large body of research on these “traditional” institutions by anthropologists 
(Archer 1984; Bailey 1960; Cohn 1987; Mandelbaum 1970), sociologists (Beteille 1971; Srinivas 1959), 
political scientists (Rudolph and Rudolph 1967), legal experts (Galanter 1989) and political 
economists (Wade 1988) was carried out before the FLGIs were mandated by the Constitution. 
Hence, very little is known about the ways in which ILGIs interact with the FLGIs. Few researchers 
have gone back to study the ways in which pre-existing local institutions at village level adapted when 
the FLGIs were superimposed on them. Equally, those researching aspects of local democratic 
institutions have tended to assume the existence of an institutional vacuum at local level, which is 
filled by the formal local governance institutions. This belief gains credence from the assumption that 
ILGIs are relics of ‘traditional’ systems and are shrinking in face of competition from FLGIs and will 
gradually disappear. Consequently, researchers working on local governance have not paid enough 
attention to the interface between ILGIs and FLGIs. 
 
6  Informal local governance: India in comparative perspective 
In much of the world and for much of the time, politics and governance are pursued through informal 
institutions and channels. There is nothing especially remarkable about informality itself in the public 
sphere. I have used the term “informality” here to label a set of institutions that is important to the local 
governance of poor, rural societies: institutions, in various ways rooted in notions of “traditionality” and 
in locally-specific practices, which exercise public authority at local level through mechanisms distinctly 
different from those employed by “formal” state institutions. If we accept that informality is a matter of 
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degree rather than an absolute characteristic, we can see that a wide variety of institutions, especially in the 
rural areas of poor countries, can be categorised as informal local governance institutions (ILGIs). Some 
of them, like the “traditional authorities” found in many African countries, have a formal dimension, in 
that they are (a) recognised (and perhaps nominated) by formal state institutions and (b) have authority in 
some domains - such as land allocation, “traditional” courts and “customary justice” – which is recognised 
and supported by the formal state (Keulder 1998; Schärf 2003; Goodenough 2002). By contrast, the 
ILGIs that I studied in Karnataka are almost totally informal, in the sense that their existence is in no way 
recognised by the state or in state law, and their authority is accepted by state agencies only in very specific 
contexts. For example, the police may sometimes seek information about the previous decisions of ILGIs 
in dispute cases that reach them.  
Why do we find so many informal – including quasi-formal – local governance institutions in poor 
Southern countries? The main reason is that states in the South – and especially in countries formerly 
ruled by European colonial powers – often remained relatively incomplete, especially at local level. It was 
not worthwhile for the colonial authorities to extend the main institutions of rule, in their standard 
bureaucratic form, down to the local level. They instead practised variants of what was often termed 
indirect rule, i.e. they used selected powerful local individuals or families to rule locally in a mode that was 
formally non-bureaucratic. These “local notables” were not public employees, but were represented as 
exercising “traditional authority”. They were chiefs in much of Africa, zamindars in parts of India, mudaliyars 
(“headmen”) in Sri Lanka (Ceylon), etc. In India the state relied upon these notables not only for revenue 
collection but also for other services (Krishna 2002). Below these “traditional authorities”, at the very 
local level, were governance institutions that combined, in varying degrees, monopolistic, exclusionary 
power stemming from association with the “traditional authorities” with some more collectivist structures 
representing different groups in local societies (Cohn 1971; Frykenberg 1969; Mandelbaum 1970). In the 
Karnataka case, “traditional” village panchayats embodied both these elements: they comprised dominant 
castes and large landowners, but also, through a limited representation principle, permitted a degree of 
pluralism among these population groups. 
In Karnataka – and, to the best of my understanding, in India more generally – the post-colonial 
history of many of these ILGIs is relatively distinct, especially at the local level. In other countries, and at 
the level at which zamindars operated in India, these “colonial” ILGIs have been politically unpopular. 
Demands for their abolition or radical reform were often intrinsic to nationalist, anti-colonial political 
programmes. In Sri Lanka, “village headmen” lost their positions in 1956 (Moore 1985). Kwame 
Nkrumah, Prime Minister of the first British colony in Africa to gain independence, not only tried to 
suppress the powers of Ghana’s “traditional chiefs” but also managed to systematically reconstruct 
“chieftaincy” in the 1950s (Crook 1986; Rathbone 2000). Similarly, soon after independence President 
Mugabe eliminated “traditional leaders” from rural administration in Zimbabwe mainly to ‘maintain a 
monopoly of social control’ (Keulder 1998). While most Indian states formally abolished the zamindari 
system soon after Independence, village-level ILGIs have persisted and thrived. Despite what is reported 
in the early part of this paper about the hostility and suspicions of “urban India”, ILGIs have never 
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become a significant political issue in post-Independence India. Unlike in Sri Lanka, Ghana and elsewhere, 
progressive political parties have not called for their abolition. Demands for their abolition, which have 
mostly come from urban progressive groups, have been sporadic and largely responses to some horrific 
news report. Ignored by urban populations and by most state agencies, in legislation and in the design of 
local government, ILGIs have continued to exercise considerable authority, command a fair degree of 
legitimacy, provide useful services, and enforce, sometimes in controversial ways, norms and behaviour 
that are often themselves quite contested. 
Why do ILGIs have this particular history in India? More precisely, what is it that, in a comparative 
context, we need to explain about informal local governance in India? A distinctive feature of India is the 
continued presence of villages that have long history as established “territorial units”. In his case study of 
16 Rajasthan villages, Krishna (2002: 33–4) found that some had a history that could be dated back to 
more than 500 years. Despite a substantial increase in the population, the boundaries of these villages have 
remained largely unchanged. Apart from the persistence of relatively active ILGIs at local level long after 
the end of colonial rule, there seem to be two general features of Indian informal local governance for 
which we need to account: 
 
1. First, it seems that, relative to many other countries, ILGIs in India can often reasonably be described 
as “local village level governments”. They perform such a wide range of functions that they 
approximate to local all-purpose territorial authorities. They are not simply “burial societies”, “rural 
development committees” or “temple committees”, as in Sri Lanka (Moore 1985: 228–9); dispute-
resolution bodies, like Bangladeshi shalish (Rahman and Islam 2002); or local vigilante committees, as 
in Tanzania (Mwaikusa 1995). In varying degrees, ILGIs in India: resolve disputes; keep the peace; 
assist the unfortunate; finance and support temples; organise religious and social festivals; help 
develop local infrastructure and resources; influence how the village is represented at higher political 
levels; and negotiate directly with those higher levels.  
2. Second, Indian ILGIs have adapted, in composition, activities and in their interactions with higher 
level institutions, to a range of long-term changes in Indian society and polity, notably to 
democratisation. Unlike, say, South African “traditional leaders”, Indian ILGIs cannot plausibly be 
represented dominantly in terms of resistance or opposition to either contemporary values or the 
agencies of the democratic state.   
 
In characterising Indian ILGIs in this way, I am consciously generalising from my Karnataka research and 
a few other sources from other parts of the country (Krishna 2002). I accept that we do not yet have 
enough knowledge about ILGIs in different parts of India to fully justify this degree of generalisation. But 
I am confident that I am simplifying, rather than misrepresenting, India. Simplification is justified for the 
present purpose, i.e. stimulating thinking about how and why informal local governance takes certain 
forms in India, and other forms in other countries. The more we explore that question, the more we are 
likely to learn – and want to learn – about variations within India.  
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We need then to explain three things: (a) the persistence of relatively active ILGIs in rural India 
despite the near-complete lack of official recognition or sponsorship; (b) the fact that they often exercise 
broad, near-territorial authority; and (c) their capacity to interact with and influence formal elected local 
governments. How do we account for these things? Any explanation given here has to be tentative. I am 
asking a question that does not seem to have been addressed before in the social science literature. It 
seems sensible to assume that some kind of ILGIs are likely to emerge in a country like India where there 
is a relatively stable rural population, often living in quite distinct nucleated villages, under a state that has 
limited capacity to reach into village society and provide services for villagers. In such circumstances, it 
seems predictable that ILGIs of some kind should emerge, and that they should have a dual character: 
both providing collective services that benefit many people and at the same time embodying local socio-
political and gender inequality and helping to bolster the beliefs, norms and practices that conform to the 
interests of dominant groups. In other words, in explaining the pattern of ILGI activity found in India, we 
should seek less to explain why ILGIs might emerge, and concentrate more on (a) what form they might 
take and (b) why they might persist despite potential or actual contrary or hostile pressures. With these 
assumptions in mind, I can suggest three interconnected answers to the question posed above. I present 
them in inverse historical order, with the more recent factors coming first: 
 
1. In much of India, including Karnataka, the jurisdiction of the lowest tier of the formal local elected 
government institutions – the Grama Panchayat – encompasses a handful of “natural” villages – and 
ILGIs. At the same time, the boundaries of the jurisdiction of a single ILGI are rarely, if ever, divided 
among two or more FLGI areas. ILGIs “nest” neatly into the FLGI structure. In the absence of deep 
conflicts between FLGIs and ILGIs stemming from other sources, this neat vertical dovetailing of 
different levels of jurisdiction creates scope for the kinds of positive, synergistic interactions between 
the two discussed in Section 4. By contrast, one of several reasons for the more conflictual 
relationship between traditional authorities and elected local governments in South Africa is that the 
boundaries of the two sometimes cross-cut one another in a relatively arbitrary fashion (Goodenough 
2002; Mzimela 2001, and personal interviews with some traditional chiefs in KwaZulu Natal region, 
2003). This militates against the coordination of action or policy in both domains, and increases the 
chances of conflict.   
2. India has long been a democracy, with a relatively active and politically aware electorate. This has 
contributed to a fairly tolerant environment: in the absence of strong electoral demands to abolish or 
curtail ILGIs, no government has been eager to take action against them. Equally, other local 
government institutions, whether bureaucratic or, more recently, democratic, have all been under the 
general supervision of democratically-elected higher level state and central governments. Even if they 
had perceived ILGIs as competitors to be suppressed, people in positions of authority in these other 
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local government institutions could not expect to receive support from above for any such practices. 
These kinds of antagonisms are more likely in a non-democratic environment.20  
3. Most important in the long term, ILGIs in India have not generally been able to exercise such 
extensive or arbitrary power over their constituents that they have generated strong internal tensions 
and antagonisms, and for that reason either decayed or stimulated demands for government 
interventions. There are of course exceptions to this statement: I opened this paper with some of 
them. But, in a comparative international context, it is the limits on the authority of Indian ILGIs that 
are most striking. In that comparative context, three particular factors place limits on the authority of 
Indian ILGIs: 
 
• Unlike traditional authorities in other countries, including many in Africa, ILGIs in India are only 
marginally involved in decisions affecting land rights. They do sometimes rule over inheritance, 
encroachment, and other land disputes, but the extent of their effective authority to re-allocate land 
among individuals and families is very limited – and has been so for a very long time. By contrast, in 
much of Africa, chiefs and other traditional authorities still have considerable authority to allocate 
unused land to existing residents or new arrivals, to authorise land transactions between ordinary 
citizens, and even to dispossess existing rights holders involuntarily (Keulder 1998; Goodenough 
2002; Mamdani 1998). Such power is inevitably controversial. The institution that wields it is 
perpetually vulnerable to the allegation of having used it for private benefit. And there often is a 
great deal of truth in such allegations. It is difficult to imagine that ILGIs enjoying such powers could 
survive long in democratic India. They never had to, for two reasons. One is that, relative to much of 
Africa, the land frontier has long been closed in mainstream rural India. Excepting some relatively 
marginal (often tribal) agricultural areas and parts of the remote northeast of the country, we can, as 
a rough approximation, say that the land frontier has been closed since Independence over half a 
century ago. The second reason stretches further back into history. The colonial authorities, 
extending the practices already established by pre-colonial rulers, relied heavily for their revenue on a 
land tax system that typically harvested for the state a high proportion of the value of agricultural 
output. And that land tax system in turn depended on the early creation and maintenance of an 
elaborate system of written records of land ownership and use that, in principle at least, contained 
details on individual land plots and holding in every village. In reality, these records were not fully 
accurate. But the wonder is that they were so extensive in a poor agrarian society. A necessary 
corollary to the effectiveness of the land record system was a system of legislation and courts 
through which major land disputes could be fought. The courts were in reality imperfect and biased 
institutions. If decisions were made there, they could be influenced by the contents of the land 
records maintained at village level. Differences over land rights did not always go to court, but were 
                                                 
20  In addition, in some African countries, including Botswana, South Africa, Zimbabwe and Ghana, “traditional 
authorities” are represented, collectively and/or individually, formally or informally, in national level politics, 
whether through political parties, individual influence or special representative arrangements. This kind of 
influence is also likely to generate competition and controversy.  
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rather “settled” by those who controlled those records. But the important outcome for the purposes 
of  this paper is that, over a long period of historical time,21 ILGIs in rural India could not alone 
exercise a major influence over local land allocation, did not control the dominant economic 
resource, and therefore were not subjected to the stresses, internal conflicts and criticism that such 
authority tends to generate. 
• There exists in India a relatively accessible court system that is widely used by significant sections of 
the population, for land disputes or other purposes. Similarly, despite their well-known limitations, 
the police are frequently approached by rural people for assistance of various kinds. Much of the 
time, some rural people at least have a realistic possibility of approaching formal state institutions to 
deal with the kinds of issues that generally go to ILGIs. In effect, there is some scope to “appeal” the 
decisions of ILGIs to higher authorities. And, on some occasions, those higher authorities might be 
disposed, for ethical reasons or because of political considerations, to take seriously the concerns of 
members of “backward” sections of society. I guess – and this is not easy to demonstrate with the 
research methods I have so far employed – that this scope for “appeal” acts as some constraint on 
the exercise of arbitrary or self-interested authority by ILGIs.22 Were they to violate accepted norms 
too blatantly, they would risk an “appeal” that might in turn jeopardise the overall authority of the 
institution. A recent example from the state of Tamil Nadu illustrates this clearly. When a separated 
woman sought divorce from her husband, she was not only fined by the ILGI but the custody of the 
children was awarded to her husband. The fine was reduced only after she prostrated herself in front 
of each of the ILGI members and leaders. The victim complained to the police and filed a petition in 
court. The story was also picked up by the newspapers. The presiding judge not only came down 
hard on the ILGI, but he has also sought an ordinance from the state government to curb such 
incidents (The Hindu, 18 and 30 September 2003). My field research indicates that most ILGI leaders 
are politically sophisticated people. Most are likely to have developed a good appreciation of the 
broad constraints within which they operate. To quote one Scheduled Caste ILGI member from 
Mysore District: ‘We cannot afford to give wrong decisions as even if one person in the village 
questions our judgement, it damages the authority of the ILGI’.23 The slightest transgression on the 
part of ILGI leaders is taken seriously by the ILGI as it undermines the legitimacy of the institution. 
In a Karnataka village, one caste leader, also a member of the ILGI was ostracized by his caste group 
for misappropriating funds collected for a caste festivity. By losing his position as a caste leader, he 
also had to forfeit his right to be part of the ILGI. Although he was re-admitted to the caste group 
after tendering a public apology, reimbursing the money and giving a feast to the caste group, he was  
                                                 
21  It is difficult to provide any precise historical periodisation for this process. The land revenue and record 
system was well institutionalised before the end of the nineteenth century (Frykenberg 1965, 1969; Cohn 1971; 
Kessinger 1979; Smith 1996). 
22  By contrast, in much of Africa, rural populations have very little scope for appealing from traditional 
authorities to formal courts (Nyamu-Musembi 2003; Schärf 2003). 
23  Personal interview with a Scheduled Caste ILGI member in Mysore district. 
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not reinstated as a member of the ILGI. Krishna (2002) cites instances from Rajasthan villages where 
a panch was replaced as he was often found drunk in public and another because he had attempted 
to take a bribe from a member of an aggrieved party. 
• The leadership of ILGIs in India is not inherently monopolistic, in the sense that it is neither 
(a) decided by the state, as was the case with many traditional authorities (chiefs) in colonial and post-
colonial Africa, nor (b) determined purely by hereditary status. While there is a (declining) informal 
hereditary component in succession to ILGI leadership posts in much of Karnataka, there is in 
general an element of pluralism and choice about succession that stems from the multi-caste nature 
of most Karnataka villages. Individual castes within villages have their own leaders for internal (intra-
caste) and external (inter-caste) purposes. This alone provides a “natural” basis for relatively 
pluralistic representation within ILGI leaderships. This element of pluralism seems to contribute to 
the legitimacy and effectiveness of ILGIs in two ways. First, it provides another constraint on 
arbitrary or self-interested decisions: a leader likely to make a habit of blatant behaviour of this kind 
is potentially replaceable. Second, it avoids the direct undermining of the authority of the institution 
that is likely to follow if the only way of replacing failing leaders is direct intervention by the state. 
The tendency of colonial African governments to replace individual chiefs as it suited them is said to 
have helped undermine the institution of chieftaincy.  
 
The mention of the multi-caste nature of Karnataka villages in the previous paragraph signals one 
important respect in which the characterisation of “India” which I have used for comparative purposes 
may be more appropriate for some parts of the country than for others. It seems almost certain that, for 
the reasons given in the above paragraphs, multi-caste villages are more likely to experience relatively 
pluralistic internal politics, less likely to see ILGIs as mechanisms for enforcing the will or social values of 
a single or highly dominant caste, and therefore more likely to have the benefit of an ILGI which 
commands wide respect. It is accepted, as a broad generalisation, that villages in South India are more 
likely to be multi-caste than in North India. Hence, all the reports of oppressive or brutal enforcement of 
“traditional” behavioural norms cited at the beginning of this paper relate to North India, and to caste 
panchayats or ILGIs predominantly representing a single caste. This is not to imply that ILGIs in South 
India are benign institutions, but they seem to be comparatively less oppressive and more pluralistic than 
their North Indian counterparts. However, we do not yet know enough about ILGIs in different parts of 
India to determine whether the sketch I have made above really summarises the typical picture.   
 
7  Concluding comments 
In sum, ILGIs in India have two faces. I have sought to present both rather than portray them as either 
wholly benign or totally oppressive institutions. ILGIs also carry with them the social tensions and gender 
bias inherent in rural societies. Social conflicts and tensions within the villages are constantly negotiated 
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and managed, sometimes in an oppressive manner, by the ILGIs. Interestingly though, in their interface 
with FLGIs they project a picture of cohesiveness. Indeed, it is this that makes the interaction possible. 
Understanding ILGIs and the interaction between ILGIs and FLGIs has implications for local 
governance policy. If one wanted to “incorporate” ILGIs into local governance in India, there is scope to 
influence their composition.24 But not many governments grappling with the problem of accommodating 
local, informal/traditional institutions in local governance have attempted to do this. An exception is 
South Africa where the new ‘Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Bill’ (Republic of South 
Africa 2003) has attempted to create “traditional councils” which must comprise, apart from the 
traditional chiefs, one-third women members and 25 per cent democratically elected members from the 
“traditional community”. It also vests the traditional councils with powers25 and functions to interface 
with local government structures such as local municipalities. 
The purpose of this paper has been to present a more holistic picture of ILGIs, and the ways in 
which they interact with FLGIs. It is not to extol the virtues of ILGIs or to support a case for a stronger 
interaction between ILGIs and FLGIs. Evidence from the field indicates that ILGIs influence local 
democracy in many ways, and this merits further enquiry. A deeper understanding of the dynamics of this 
interaction would greatly increase the capacity of government agencies, political parties and social 
movements to better comprehend the process of local governance and intervene effectively to help 
promote the interests of the poor and the disadvantaged. 
 
                                                 
24  This aspect was brought sharply into focus during field visits in Karnataka. Members of a number of ILGIs 
admitted that although the ILGI is a patriarchal institution (controlled and dominated by older men 
representing the village establishment) it would have to conform if there is a dictate from the government 
making participation of women compulsory in this forum (as in the FLGI). 
25  The role provided is a facilitative and supportive one with little power to impact decisions. 
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